



THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTED
NOTICE TO KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY THE
AGENT IN A PREVIOUS OR DIFFERENT TRANS-
ACTION.
IT frequently happens that two or more persons bond fide
acquire equal rights in the same subject-matter or are equally
deceived by a third person, and the courts are called on to deter-
mine which shall have the priority, or which shall bear the loss.
In this class of cases neither party has had actual notice of the
fraud practised on, or of the prior right of the other, and the object
of the present inquiry is the principle upon which the law fixes
upon one of them the effects of notice. The cases upon this sub-
ject are divided into two classes : First, those of constructive notice,
in which the law will not allow a man to deny that he knows facts
which he could and ought to have discovered: Jackson v. Bowe,
2 Sim. & Stu. 472; Kennedy v. Green, 3 Myl. & K. 699; Worth-
ington v. Morgan, 16 Sir. 547; Ware v. Lord Egmont, 2 Sch.
& Lef. 327. Second, those of imputed notice, in which the law
will not allow a man to deny a knowledge of facts which his agent
knew.
To begin with what nobody denies, it may be laid down that the
law imputes to the principal a knowledge of facts which the agent
learns in the transaction in which he is employed.
1. Because the agent stands for, or literally, within his agency,
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is the principal, and therefore what he does or knows the principal
does or knows.
2. Because it is the duty of the agent to communicate such facts
to the principal, and the law presumes he has done so without put-
ting upon any one the difficult task of actually proving it.
Both these reasons apply in cases where the agent has disco-
vered the facts in the transaction in which lie is employed, but not
to those in which lie has obtained his information in a different
transaction or before his employment as agent. An examination
of the latter cases we think will show that the courts have or have
not imputed such knowledge to the principal, according as they have
adopted the first or second of these reasons.
If the first, or technical reason, be followed, then notice can not
be imputed to the principal, of any facts known to the agent, except
such as lie learned during and within the agency ; which is the
law of Pennsylvania and of most of the United States.
If the second, then all that the agent has notice of will be im-
puted to the principal, with the following natural exceptions
1. What the agent has forgotten entirely, or may have forgotten
during the agency.
2. What he could not tell his principal, e. g., professional confi-
dences.
3. An exception introduced by Lord Ch. BROUGHAM, in Ken-
nedy v. Green, 3 Myl. & K. 699, and entirely consistent with the
spirit of the reason-facts which the previous conduct of the agent
makes it certain he will conceal.
This second principle is, and we think always has been, the law
of England, and is followed in some of the United States.
The first English case upon the subject is, like many of the
earlier ones, unsatisfactory, in that it is not possible to say how
far the opinion of the court is obiter dictum, the facts not being set
out: Preston v. Tubbin, 1 Vern. 287 (1684), in which the Lord
Keeper said : "Though notice to a man's counsel be notice to the
party, yet when the counsel comes to have notice ef the title in
another affair, which it may be lie has forgot, when his client comes
to advise with him in a case, with other circumstances, tht shall
not be such a notice as to bind the party." Then came Brotherton
v. JIatt, 2 Vern. 574, decided by Lord Oh. COwEPR. A. mortgaged
lands to B., then to C., with notice of B., then to D. E. F., with
notice of B. but not of 0. The same scriveners made all the deeds,
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and it was therefore held that D. E. F. should be postponed to C.,
because the knowledge of their agent was their knowledge.
Fitzqerald v. -auconberge, Fitz Gibbon 207 (1729), is often re-
ferred to as a leading case upon the subject. The plaintiff certainly
did argue that the defendant was affected by knowledge of his
counsel previously acquired. As to this, Lord Oh. B. REYNOLDS
said: "I think there is nothing in it; for there is not the least
shadow of notice," and decided the case for the plaintiff on another
ground. What he said was consequently obiter and lacked weight,
even as an opinion, because he merely said there was no notice to
the defendant, without giving any reason why. Lord Oh. ITARD-
WICKE discussed the question in four cases. In Lowther v. Carl-
ton, 2 Atk. 242 (1741), he said: "If a counsel or attorney is em-
ployed to look over a title and by some other transaction, foreign
to the business in hand, has notice, this shall not affect the pur-
chaser; for if this was not the rule of the court, it would be a dan-
gerous consequence, as it would be an objection against the most
able counsel, because of course they would be more likely than
others of less eminence to have notice, as they are engaged in a
great number of affairs of this kind." It appears from the report
of this case in Cas. temp. Talb. 186, that the defendant was a pur-
chaser of a lease, with notice of the plaintiff's claim, from the
executors of one who had purchased the lease without notice of it,
and the point decided was that he could protect himself under the
good title which he had bought, for the obvious reason that he who
has a good title and sells, sells what he has. What Ld. HARDWICKE
said was obiter, but could be'well rested on either of the principles
which we have said lead to opposite conclusions in these cases.
Oa the first, because the notice of which he speaks was had before
the agency commenced, and on the second, because he seems to
have been thinking of notice, which was a professional confidence,
and could not be communicated, or which was such as a man of
large business would be likely to forget. The reasons which the
chancellor gave seem clearly to show that the latter explanation
was the one in his mind. He was speaking of an attorney, of
looking up a title of a purchaser taking it without actual notice of
a flaw, which though known to the attorney he would not com-
municate, either because it was a professional confidence or becanse
he bad forgotten it. For what other reason would able counsel
be more dangerous to employ than those of less eminence, since
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both must be equally presumed to do their duty to their clients ? In
JV irrick v. lWarrilc, 3 Atk. 294, Warrick, a tenant for life under
marriage articles, made a mortgage and afterwards the mortgagee
assigned the mortgage to Kniveton and the tenant for life sold him
the equity of rcdemption. The plaintiff, who was the son of the
tenant for life, and entitled to the remainder under the marriage
articles, brought his bill against Kniveton for possession and an
account. Kniveton answered that he was a purchaser for valua-
ble consideration without notice of the marriage articles. It ap-
peared that one Hawkins, since deceased, had drawn a case for
opinion of counsel as to whether Warrick could not cut off the
6state-tail created by the marriage articles and raise money, and
that lie drew the mortgage-deed for the original mortgage, and the
assignment of it to Kniveton.
"It would be a pretty hard thing to affect the lender of the
money with all kind of knowledge which the agent may have of
the title of the borrower, but still I will not lay it down as a
general rule, that where the same person is concerned for the
mortgagor and mortgagee, that notice to such persons will not be
good constructive notice to the mortgagee.
"But consider what kind of notice the defendant Kniveton bad.
Mr. Hawkins had not notice at the time of the assignment, nor
relative to this business, but before, even before the original mort-
gage. In the case of Fitzgerald v. Fauconberge, it was held that
notice should be in the same transaction ; this rule ought to be
adhered to; otherwise it would make purchasers' and mortgagees'
titles depend altogether on the memory of their counsellors and
agents, and oblige them to apply to persons of less eminence as
counsel, as not being so likely to have notice of former transac-
tions.
"The notice here was. clearly arising from that case, stated by
Hawkins at the request of Warrick in order to do something
towards suffering a common recovery. And it is a year and six
months after that Kniveton is to be affected with this notice.
"It is very probable that Hawkins might have forgotten it in
this length of time, or which is much more likely, did not under-
stand the rule of this court, but took the limitation for an estate-
tail absolute."
Does not Lord IHAIWICKE seem to have thought that by.the
general rule Kniveton would be affected by Hawkins' knowledge,
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tut that the particular circumstances made this case an excep-
tion ?
In Worsley v. The Earl of Scarborough, 3 Atk. 392, a case
without any statement of facts, he said : " Fourthly, it settled that
notice to an agent or'counsel who was employed in the thing b1
another person or in another husiness and at another time is no
notice to his client who employs him afterward, and it would be
very mischievous if it was s6, for the man of most practice and
greatest eminence would then be the most dangerous to employ."
This language would not include notice learned in another busi-
ness at the same time, as if the chancellor was still insisting that in
imputing notice to the principal regard would always be had to
the agent's memory.
In Le .eve v. Le 'eve, 8 Atk. 648, Le Neve and his wife
were life-tenants under marriage articles of certain property, re-
mainder to their issue. Upon the death of his first wife, Le Neve
made second marriage articles of this same property, as if it had
been his in fee with the defendant his intended wife. The defend-
ant employed one Norton as her attorney, who had previously re-
ceived a copy of the first marriage articles from Le Neve, in order
to take the opinion of counsel how to secure against their effect.
This was Warriek v. Warrile over again, and yet Lord HARD-
WICKE imputed her attorney's knowledge acquired previously and
in another transaction to the defendant. He said that the evi-
dence showed the strongest kind of notice to the attorney Norton.
It will be remembered that he considered the notice to Hawkins
in Warrick v. Warriek very weak. This appears to be the only
difference between the cases, and seems to confirm what we have
heretofore said of Lord HARDWICKE'S views. It may be generally
observed in the reported arguments that wherever these decisions
have been cited the first three have been relied on by one side, and
the fourth by the other. We have gone into them at this length
because Lord HAFDWICKE has often been spoken of as the father
of the first principle, which the English courts do not follow, but
we think that an examination of them shows that the general
principle in his mind was that the knowledge of the agent affect-
ing the transaction was the knowledge of the principal, except
where it appeared probable that the agent had forgotten it or
where he could not professionally communicate it. If we are
right, then the English courts, from Preston v. Tubbins to the
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present day, have followed the same rule, and certainly their own
books do not speak of or endeavor to reconcile any inconsistency
in the cases.
IKiern v. Hill, 13 Ves. Jr. 120 (1806), which is often referred
to as an authority on this point, was decided by Lord Oh. ERSKINE
on the ground of actual notice.
In Toulmin v. Steere, 3 Meriv. 221 (1817), a conveyancer who
had made an annuity deed in 1805, and paid it ever since, made a
deed of the property upon which it was a charge in 1810, to the
defendant who had no notice of the annuity. Lowther v. Carlton
and J1arrlek v. I rarrick were both cited to prove that notice to the
agent to affect the principal must have been acquired in the same
transaction. But Sir WILLIAM GRANT, M. R., held that the
defendant must be considered to have notice, because his agent had
"complete and continued notice of the existence of the annuity,"
an uimnistakable assertion of the second principle, without a com-
ment on Lord IIAIIDWICKE'S decisions, to show that he considered
them really or apparently irreconcilable with his own opinion.
In ullountford v. Scott, 3 Mad. 40 (1818), Sir JoHnz LEACH gave
clear expression to the first principle for the first time in the Eng-
lish books, saying: "The agent stands in place of the principal,
and notice therefore to the agent is notice to the principal, but he
cannot stand in the place of the principal until the relation of
principal and agent is constituted ; and as to all the information
which he has previously acquired, the principal is a mere stranger."
But in the same case on appeal, 1 Turn. & Russ. 279, Lord
ELDON expressly disapproved of what the M. R. had said on this
point as follows: "The vice-chancellor in this case appears to
have proceeded upon the notion that nptice to a man in one trans-
action is not to be taken as notice to him in another transaction,
in that view of the case it might fall to be considered whether one
transaction might not follow so closely upon the other as to render
it impossible to give a man credit for having forgotten it. I should
be unwilling to go so far as to say that if an attorney had notice
of a transaction in the morning, lie shall be held in a court of
equity to have forgotten it in the evening, it must in all cases
depend upon the circumstances."
Kennedy v. Green, 3 Myl. & K. 699, although really decided
upon the ground of constructive, contains also an interesting dis-
cussion of imputed notice, which has given the case its greatest
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value as an authority. An attorney had induced a client by fraud
to execute an assignment to him of her interest in certain property,
and subsequently secured from his father-in-law a loan upon the
security of it. Sir JOHN LEACH, Al. R., completely corrected by
Lord ELDON in one direction and about to be corrected by Lord
BROUGHAM in the other, considered the mortgagor the attorney
of his father-in-law and said: "It is said that this is a case similar
to those in which the court has declared that a client is not to be
affected by notice of a solicitor in a prior transaction. This case
has no analogy to that principle. Bostock is here to be considered
as if in this transaction notice had been given to him by a third
person of the fraud committed upon Mirs. Kennedy. If Bostock,
acting both for the mortgagor and mortgagee, had received notice of
a fraud thus committed upon Mrs. Kennedy by a third person, it
would plainly have been notice to Kirby; and Bostock, being in full
possession of knowledge of the fraud, because he was himself the
author of it, Kirby is as much affected by his solicitor's know-
ledge of the fraud as if the solicitor had acquired the knowledge
from a third person." The spirit of this reasoning evidently is
that the knowledge must certainly have been in the attorney's
mind during his second employment. But Lord BROUGHAM, on
appeal, dissented from these views, on the ground that where the
solicitor was himself the contriver of and gainer by the transac-
tion he would certainly conceal the fraud from his client, and
therefore the law would not impute it to the latter. Thus adding
to the second principle the third exception we have mentioned,
which is entirely consistent with the spirit of it; the law will not
impute to the principal the knowledge of the agent when the con-
duct of the latter has beer such as to compel concealment.
Upon the second principle generally see also Hargreave8 v.
Rothwell, 1 Keen 154 (1836); Senehan v. lfCabe, 2 Ir. Eq.
351 (1840), and -Fuller v. Bennett, 2 Hare 394 (1843).
In Hewitt v. Loosemore, 9 Hare 456, a solicitor had obtained
money from a client upon the deposit of a lease. He afterwards
made a mortgage upon the leasehold property to his brother to
whom it was clearly proved he did not communicate the fact of
the prior mortgage. Vice-Chancellor TURNER said: "I am of
opinion, therefore, that R. Loosemore (the mortgagor) must be
considered to. have been the agent and solicitor of the defendant
in the transaction of his mortgage; but I do not think that the
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defendant is therefore to be considered to have notice of the plain-
tiffs deposit; such notice would be constructive merely, and con-
structive notice is knowledge which the court imputes to a party
upon a presumption so strong that it cannot be allowed to be re-
buttel, that the knowledge must have been communicated, and I
cannot act upon such a presumption in the face of the evidence
which the plaintiff has himself adduced.
"In determining this point in favor of the defendant, I desire it
to be understood that I do not proceed upon the case of Kennedy
v. Green." Yet iennedy v. Green would appear to be the only
ground upon which to justify such a conclusion, and the reason of
that case would seem to apply, viz: that the conduct of the attor-
ney was such as to require concealment of the fact of the prior
equitable mortgage. Regarded in any other light the judgment
of the court does away with the doctrine of imputed notice entirely,
because it is tantamount to saying that the inquiry always is
whether the facts have or have not been actually communicated.
In Atterbury v. Walls, 8 DeG., M. & G. 454 (1856), one
Parsons mortgaged certain property, May 22d 1838, to a solicitor,
Lampray, -who assigned his mortgage six (lays after to the plain-
tiff. A year after, Parsons, Warder and Lampray, without any
mention of the assignment of his mortgage to the plaintiff, released
the premises in fee to the defendant, Wallis. L.JJ. KNIGHT
IBRUCE and TURNER both considered Lampray to have acted as
solicitor to the purchaser, the defendant, and imputed his know-
ledge of the assignment to the latter, and distinguished the case
from Kennedy v. Green, on the ground that there a fraud had
been committed originally, and independently of the consideration
-whether the act was made known or not, while here, the question
of fraud depended upon whether the act done had been made known
or not. 'hy the judgments should have been different in Hewitt v.
Loosemore and this case can only be explained by supposing that
the court found actual notice in the latter and not in the former
to the defendant, without in any way depending upon the doc-
trine of imputed notice. A very much better reasoned case, where
the facts were exactly similar, is Espin v. Pemberton, 3 DeG. &
J. 554 (1859). A solicitor deposited a lease with the plaintiff as
security for an advance, and afterwards assigned the leasehold to
the defendant for a valuable consideration. Lord CIIELMSFORD held
in opposition to the two foregoing cases that under such circum-
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stances the mortgagee could not be said to have employed the
mortgagor as his attorney, and therefore the knowledge of the
latter could not be imputed to him. If the chancellor had con-
sidered him to have so acted, it will be seen from the following
extract from his opinion, that he would have come to a conclusion
the direct opposite of that which was arrived at in the first of those
cases: "But if the mortgagor under those circumstances becomes
the solicitor of the mortgagee, it is hardly possible to stop of
applying all the consequences of the relation and to refuse to
impute the knowledge which the mortgagor possesses, to his client,
the niortgagce. You cannot escape from this conclusion unless
you apply the principle of the case of Kennedy v. Green, and
exclude this particular knowledge, because the mortgagor was com-
mitting a fraud in the transaction which he could not be presumed
to communicate. But I have already shown that imputed know-
ledge does not -depend upon whether it was communicated or not,
and therefore the presumption of non-communication does not seem
to be the proper principle to apply."
Ogilvie v. Jeaffreson, 2 Giff. 853 (1860), was a case like Kennedy
v. Green, and decided upon the ground of constructive notice,
though Vice-Ch. STUART said that there was no substantial differ-
ence between cases decided on ground of constructive and those de-
cided on ground of imputed notice, both depending upon negligence.
In Dresser v. Norwood, 17 C. B. N. S. 466 (1864), and Rolland
v. Hart, Law Rep. 6 Ch. App. 678 (1871), the second principle, as
we have laid down, is adopted so as to leave no doubt about the law
in England. In the former, POLLOCK, C. B., says: "We think that
in a commercial transaction of this description, where the agent
of the buyer purchases, on behalf of his principal, goods of the
factor of the seller, the agent having present to his mind, at the
time of the purchase, knowledge that the goods he is buying are
not the goods of the factor, though sold in the factor's name, the
knowledge of the agent, however acquired, is the knowledge of the
principal. It seems to be conceded, that if at the time of the sale
the factor of the seller had expressly told the agent of the buyer,
that the goods were not his property, but the property of his prin-
cipal, it would not have been a case for a set-off, but why should
the factor tell the buyer's agent that which he was well aware that
the agent already knew ? The knowledge of the factor of the seller
that the buyer's agent was aware that he was only the factor, in
our judgment makes the case perfectly clear. But it is not to be
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understood that we mean to admit that the case would have been
different if the factor was ignorant that the knowledge of that fact
was present to the mind of the buyer's agent, provided it really
was so present."
In the latter, Lord Ch. IIATIIERLY says, after approving of the
distinction drawn in Atterbury v. Irallis, between that case and
Jennedy v. Green: "It has been held over and over again, that
notice to a sulicitor of a transaction and about matters as to which
it is part of his duty to inform himself, is actual notice to the client.
Mankind would not be safe if it were held, that under such circum-
stances a man has not notice of that which his agent has actual
notice of. The purchaser of an estate has, in ordinary cases, no
personal knowledge of the title, but employs a solicitor, and can
never be allowed to say, that he knew nothing of some prior en-
cumbrance because he was not told of it by his solicitor."
Whatever the agent has in his mind during the transaction, which
affects it, and which he could communicate, is the knowledge of
the principal wherever obtained, except where a prior fraud
committed bv the agent makes it certain that lie would conceal his
knowledge.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of The
Distilled .Spirits, 11 Wallace 356, which appears to be the only one
that has arisen there upon this question, has adopted the rule laid
down in Dresser v. NYorwi'ood with full approval, after an argument
in which all the authorities were cited.
The first case in Pennsylvania upon this subject was -Mood v.
.Fahnestoek, 8 Watts 489. Jacob Hennington having bought land
and received a deed, afterwards surrendered the deed to his grantor
and took a new deed to James Ilennington, the latter paying no
consideration. This deed was drawn by Banks, an attorney. The
property was afterwards sold at sheriff's sale as the property of
James Ilennington to McGill, who sold it to Hood, Banks prepar-
ing this second deed. The creditors of Jacob Hennington brought
ejectment against Hood, and sought to impute to him the knowledge
of Banks. SERIGEANT, J., said: "It is now well settled that if one in
the course of his business as agent, attorney, or counselfor another,
obtained knowledge from which a trust would arise, and after-
wards became the agent, attorney or counsel of the subsequent
purchaser in an independent and unconnected transaction, his
previous knowledge is not notice to such other person for whom
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hl acts. The reason is, that no man can be supposed to carry
always in his mind a recbllection of former occurrences; and more-
over, in the case of the attorney or counsel, it might be contrary to
his duty to reveal the confidential communications of his client.
To visit the principal with constructive notice, it is necessary that
the knowledge of the agent or attorney should be gained in the course
of the same transaction in which he is employed by his client."
This language, though more positive and definite, is very much
like Lord HARDWICKE'S in Lowther v. Carlton, in respect that the
rule laid down looks one way, and the reasons given for it the
other. In Bracken v. Miller, 4 W. & S. 110, nothing ought to
have been said about imputed notice at all, because there was no
evidence that the person who had knowledge of the trust, if any,
was the agent of the person to whom his knowledge was sought to
be imputed. But SERGEANT, J., said: "It is at best rather a
dubious ground on which to conclude that a principal had notice,
because, for various reasons, he may not communicate his know-
ledge to his principal, although strictly it might be his duty to do
so, but to a certain extent it has been so- considered, and where it
occurs during the same transaction where the knowledge of it is
fresh, and the memory recent and the events transpiring are of
importance to the interests of the principal, there is perhaps good
reason for it ; but it cannot be so inferred of an old and different
transaction, of a knowledge deposited in a secret paper, one which
the agent has long ago perhaps laid aside as obsolete, or which he
may, as the plaintiff suggests, have an interest in suppressing all
knowledge of, lest a development of it should defeat the object con-
templated by him." Which certainly is open to the objection
before made, that in any case where the reasons given for the rile
did not exist, knowledge of the agent might be imputed to the
principal whenever acquired, which would be a virtual abandonment
of the principle. In Jlartin v. Jackson, 3 Casey 508, there was
also no occasion to refer to this doctrine, because the purchaser at
sheriff's sale claimed by a title paramount to. and independent
of that of which it was attempted to charge him with notice.
LEwis, C. J., however, said: "The knowledge acquired by attor-
ney in another transaction between other parties, does not affect
one who subsequently employs him," and referred to the two fore-
going cases.
Within a few months the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has
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decided the case of ITouseman v. Tlie Building Association, 83 Leg.
Int. 108, which came up on a case stated as follows: "The action
was in trespass on the case for dainages alleged to have been suffered
by the plaintiffs, by reason of the inaccuracy of certain certificates
of search given by the defendant in his official capacity as recorder
of deeds of Philadelphia.
"In 1871, C. MN. S. Leslie, a conveyancer of good standing,
applied to the Girard Mlutual Building and Loan Association (the
plaintiffs) for two loans of $2000 and $1600, to be respectively
secured by mortgages which were duly executed upon premises
belonging to Leslie.
"It was testified by the plaintiffs' conveyancer that Leslie
was in haste, and had offered to procure the searches for him, say-
ing that he could get them more quickly out of the recorder's office,
as lie had more facilities. Ile was permitted to do so. The
searches failed to show any prior mortgages and were received
and examined by the conveyancer before the money was paid
Leslie. Prior mortgages existed which rendered those in question
valueless."
The counsel for the recorder endeavored to impute to the associa-
tion the knowledge which their agent Leslie bad of the prior mort-
gages. SHARSWOOD, J., said: " It is argued that by the employ-
ment of the owner as his agent for this purpose, the defendants
are affected with his knowledge of the existence of the mortgage,
which was omitted in the certificate. This is a very familiar prin-
ciple and well settled. But it is equally well settled that the
principal is only to be affected by knowledge acquired in the
course of the business in which the agent was employed; this limit-
ation of the rule is perfectly well established by our own cases,
and it is not necessary to look further: Rood v. -Pahnestock, 8
Watts 489 ; Bracken v. Miller, 4 W. & S. 110; 3Martin v. Jack-
son, 3 Casey 508. It is a mistake to suppose that it depends upon
the reason that no man can be supposed always to carry in his mind
a recollection of former occurrences, and that if it be proved that he
actually had it in his mind at the time the rule is different. It may
support the reasonableness of the rule to consider that the memory of
man is fallible in the very best and varies in different men. But the
true reason of the limitation is a technical one; that it is only dur-
ing the agency that the agent represents an'l stands in the shoes
of the principal. Notice to him, then, is notice to the principal.
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Notice to him twenty-four hours before the relation commenced is
no more notice than twenty-four hours after it has ceased would be.
Knowledge can be no better than direct actual notice. It was
incumbent on the plaintiff to show that the knowledge of the agent,
to use the accurate language of our cases, ' was gained in the trans-
action in which he was employed.' There was not only no evidence
of this offered by the plaintiff, but it was plain that it had been
gained before and in an entirely different transaction. It is not
necessary to consider, in this view of the matter, whether the alleged
agent was really such, or only the servant or clerk of the convey-
ancer."
This opinion is most satisfactory in putting the doctrine that
confines imputed notice to what the agent learns in the very trans-
action upon the only ground on which it can consistently rest.
Wherever else it has been expressed reasons have been given for it
which practically nullify it as a principle, except in the opinion of
Sir JOHN LEAcH, Vice-Ch., in Afountford v. Seott, supra, which
was repudiated by Lord ELDON on appeal. It is noticeable that
starting from cases very much alike in tone the English and the
Pennsylvania courts have reached directly opposite conclusions.
The former have followed out to their legitimate results the reasons
given for the positive rule that confines imputed notice to the very
transaction and have abandoned the rule itself; the latter have
clung to the rule and have abandoned the reasons given for it. At
last we have a rule that is perfectly simple and which leaves only
questions of fact to be determined. Pennsylvania courts will be
spared the distress of going through the refinements and distinc-
tions that have perplexed those of England, and so far as the com-
parative equity of the two rules is concerned little can be said for
the superior equity of any principle which is intended to select one
out of two or more equally innocent and deceived persons to bear
a loss. Perhaps the consideration that the court went very far
out of its way to decide the case upon the question of notice may
weaken it as a judicial authority. For everywhere and under
every rule it is clear that the knowledge of the agent to affect his
principal, however or whenever obtained, must concern his agency.
The knowledge that a man's coachman may chance to possess of
a prior lien upon property that his employer is about to lend on,
will certainly not affect the latter, and so Leslie's knowledge of
prior liens could not possibly be grafted on an agency merely to
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order searches and not to make them. It was on this ground that
Kenan v. The Ins. Co., 12 Iowa 132, was decided. An insur-
anxce had been effected upon a large hall in a foreign insurance
company, through its resident agent, a condition of which policy
was that nothing should be done by'the insured to increase the
risk. This condition the insured subsequently broke and the build-
ing was burned. In an action on the policy the insured sought to
charge the company with the knowledge that the building was
being so used, because their agent knew it. The court said:
" But even then it must be understood that the knowledge which
he acquired and by which the company would be bound must have
been communicated to him as such agent and not by mere rumors
and talks upon the street corners." So in Winchester v. 17allette,
4 Md. 231, the president of a railroad company, to secure his own
indebtedness to the company, had mortgaged to it lands upon which
his wife had a prior equitable claim by virtue of an unrecorded
deed. His knowledge was held not to affect the company because
the principle " can have no application to a case in which the one
party does not act as agent, but avowedly for himself, and adversa-
rily to the interests of the other."
Similarly in Ins. Co. v. Slhriver et al., 3 Md. Ch. 388, a company
lent on certain property and registered their mortgage upon which
there existed a prior unregistered mortgage. The court declined
to impute to the company the knowledge that its president had of
the prior mortgage, on the ground that he must have received notice
of it officially in order to bind his company. And this was the
principle upon which the case of The Bank v. Davis, 2 Hill 463,
was decided, the only ground for questioning the decision being
whether one director out of a board of five who were considering
some commercial paper for discount could be said to represent the
bank sufficiently to affect it with his knowledge of a fraud in the
paper.
All these cases go on the ground that in the transaction in
which the person with notice was acting, he either was not the
agent of the person to whom the notice was sought to be imputed
at all, or else the facts of which he had notice were not within his
agency. It would appear to be a mistake to cite them as they con-
stantly are cited upon the question of imputed notice when the
agency itself is not in dispute. See also Bankc v. Pa ne, 25
Conn. 449.
